0 · Why this scenario
Of the six segments in the PRD, female rideshare drivers are the beachhead: largest per-user risk exposure (cash, isolation, strangers), highest willingness to pay (proven $15–25/mo for dashcams), lowest CAC (driver Slack/FB groups), and the only segment that exercises every Mayday capability — long shifts, app in background, locked phone-on-mount, hands on wheel, eyes on the road.
Scenario snapshot
Who
Maria, 31 — 5-year Lyft vet, full-time, drives Thu–Sun 8pm–3am. Two kids at home with her partner. Mom in Colombia. Drives a 2019 Camry with a dashcam mount and a phone-on-vent mount.
What
11:42pm, I-285 West, Atlanta. Mid-ride, passenger (male, late 20s, picked up near a bar) leans forward, grabs her arm, demands she “take the next exit and forget the GPS.” Airbag-deployed energy. Rear-seat camera was already on (dashcam), but her phone Mayday app is sleeping on the mount.
Why it matters
Without Mayday, Maria’s options are: fight, comply, or one-hand reach for the phone to dial 911 — all while driving 65mph with a stranger inches behind her. With Mayday, she speaks two words and the system handles the rest.
1 · Use-case map
13 use cases spanning pre-event (UC-1 → UC-5), the event itself (UC-6 → UC-11), and post-event (UC-12 → UC-13). Each UC links to its requirements at the bottom.
| ID | Use case | Actor | Trigger | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UC-1 | Discover the app | Maria | Driver Slack/IG ad | Visits App Store |
| UC-2 | Install the app | Maria | Tap "Get" | App on phone, account created |
| UC-3 | Onboard & configure | Maria + Mayday | First launch | Voice trained, contacts set, social templates, drill run |
| UC-4 | Run first safety drill | Maria + Mayday | Drill button | Full simulation, no real dispatch |
| UC-5 | Begin a shift | Maria + Mayday | Background arm | Voice listener active, idle |
| UC-6 | Trigger Mayday | Maria | Voice "Mayday Mayday Mayday" | Silent emergency state |
| UC-7 | Capture evidence | Mayday | Auto on trigger | Front+back cam + audio to cloud |
| UC-8 | Broadcast to trusted contacts | Mayday + Twilio | Auto on trigger | SMS+push to 5 contacts w/ live link |
| UC-9 | AI voice call | Mayday AI + BPO | Auto on trigger | Human voice on Maria's phone <30s |
| UC-10 | 911 dispatch | BPO + RapidSOS | Operator decides | 911 w/ location + audio relay |
| UC-11 | Resolve the event | All | Safe-word OR scene stabilized | Recording sealed, contacts notified |
| UC-12 | Evidence handoff | Maria + Mayday + police | Investigator requests | Signed evidence package |
| UC-13 | Post-incident care | Maria + Mayday + partner orgs | Event closed | Counseling referral, claims, debrief |
2 · UC-1 — Discover the app
Scenario
Maria is reading her driver-only Slack when another driver posts a screenshot of a Mayday-trigger event with the caption: "Used this twice. Both times the operator talked the guy down before I even had to stop driving." She taps the link.
Main flow
DRIVER-SLACK → first month free, then $9.99/mo.Outcome
App downloaded. Referral attribution logged with 30-day cookie.
3 · UC-2 — Install & account creation
Main flow
users table; subscription_status='trialing'; trial end = install + 30d.device_id + push token stored.Pre-conditions
- iOS 17+ / Android 14+ (per PRD §6.1); older OS shows graceful "update required" screen.
Post-conditions
- Account exists; trial active; encrypted local vault initialized.
- App routes to UC-3 Onboarding.
4 · UC-3 — Onboarding & configuration
Main flow (≈90 seconds, single-screen-per-step)
"I'm not safe. Last seen: [auto]. Call Lyft Safety: 855-865-9553."Post-conditions
Account fully configured; encrypted vault holds wake-word model + voiceprint; contacts indexed; routes to drill.
5 · UC-4 — First safety drill
Purpose
Build muscle memory and prove the loop works on Maria's actual device, network, and voice — without dispatching anyone. Required monthly thereafter (auto-prompt).
Main flow
Outcome
Maria has used the loop end-to-end. Trust established. App badge turns from SETUP to ARMED.
6 · UC-5 — Begin a shift (background arm)
Main flow
Edge cases handled
- Low battery (<15%) — banner suggests plugging in but stays armed.
- Airplane mode — listener stays on; broadcast queued & sent on reconnection; SMS falls back to local 911 push-button.
- Headphones connected — uses headset mic + speakers; still triggers normally.
7 · UC-6 — The trigger (t = 0)
It is 11:42pm. Maria is on I-285 West, ~7 minutes from drop-off. The passenger has leaned forward and grabbed her arm. Both hands should be on the wheel.
Main flow
Acceptance criteria
- End-to-end trigger latency (last syllable → capture start) ≤ 1.0s (P95).
- Passenger cannot detect the trigger from screen, sound, or vibration.
- If trigger is in error, safe-word stops the event within 5s of speaking it.
8 · UC-7 — Evidence capture
Main flow
event_chunks table) — this is the chain-of-custody receipt.Edge cases
- Cell drops — chunks queue locally; upload resumes automatically; ledger records gaps.
- Storage full — older chunks drop first; current event never dropped.
- Phone damaged — captured-so-far is safe in cloud; on-phone vault preserves the last 30 min locally until next reconnect.
Acceptance
- 30-min continuous capture without dropping a chunk.
- Chain-of-custody hash verifiable end-to-end.
- Auto-purge after 30 days unless flagged by UC-11 / UC-12.
9 · UC-8 — Broadcast to trusted contacts
Main flow
broadcast job: 5 contacts × {SMS + push + email fallback}.t = 1.2s884-233 (MNDAY).Acceptance
- SMS delivered to all 5 contacts within 5s of trigger (Twilio median ≈1.4s in US).
- Live audio link is opt-in per contact (default opt-in for marked "always listen").
Failure modes
- Twilio down — fall back to Bandwidth; then to Apple/Android push with SMS retry via secondary provider.
- Contact phone off — SMS queues; voicemail fallback is OPTIONAL and requires user pre-consent (avoids legal issues).
10 · UC-9 — AI voice call & operator handoff
This is the heart of the system — and the bet that no other safety app makes.
Main flow
+1 (404) 555-MDAY) to Maria's phone. Audio is auto-answered at low volume so the passenger may not notice immediately.t = 4sWhy a human, not just AI
- De-escalation research (Police Foundation, FBI BAU) shows trained humans outperform AI in crisis dialogue.
- Operator judgment on "is this real?" is faster and more accurate than any 2026 LLM.
- Liability: a licensed human dispatcher on the call is the legal lever insurance + courts accept.
Acceptance
- Human voice on Maria's line ≤ 30s P95.
- Recording chain-of-custody unbroken from Maria's phone to operator's headset.
11 · UC-10 — 911 dispatch
Main flow
Edge cases
- PSAP rejects audio relay (some rural jurisdictions) — fall back to text-to-911 + voice-only relay to Maria.
- Cell signal lost — last-known GPS sent; BPO continues calling Maria's voicemail with pre-recorded instruction.
- Maria becomes unreachable — escalation: call partners, call Lyft's Critical Response Line, then 911 with cell-silent dispatch.
12 · UC-11 — Resolve the event
Main flow
Outcome
Event sealed. Maria is physically safe. Recording held under legal hold pending UC-12. Total elapsed trigger-to-resolve: 11 minutes 14 seconds.
13 · UC-12 — Evidence handoff
Main flow (3 days after the event)
Compliance anchors
- Fed. R. Evid. 901 (authentication) — chain-of-custody PDF + notarized hash.
- Fed. R. Evid. 902(13)/(14) — certified records from a digital process.
- GA two-party consent (OCA §16-11-66) — recording disclosed on AI/human handoff (PRD §12).
14 · UC-13 — Post-incident care
Main flow
Why this matters
Aftercare is the lever that turns a one-time user into a 5-year subscriber. It also reduces PTSD-driven churn — and is the highest-impact part of the product for the user's actual recovery.
15 · Cross-cutting error & edge cases
| Scenario | Detection | Fallback |
|---|---|---|
| False trigger (cough / sneeze / TV in background matches voiceprint) | Personalized threshold + audio-event cross-check | AI pre-screen for 8s; if no threat signals, automatic safe-disarm; user sees "Was that you? Tap to confirm" |
| Phone stolen mid-event | Disconnect + GPS shows sustained motion faster than running | Operator calls the phone; if no answer, calls partners; if threat to operator is heard, immediate 911 dispatch via cell-silent |
| Cellular outage (rural / subway / jamming) | No ack from cloud within 5s of trigger | Local 30-min buffer; auto-flush on reconnect; pre-cached SMS via satellite (iOS 18 emergency SOS via satellite) |
| Battery dies | Last gasp event with last GPS+audio chunk | Cloud-broadcast "Phone went dark at X" to contacts; contacts receive Mayday operator call to coordinate on-the-ground help |
| Passenger sees the screen | n/a | Stealth UI design (PRD §4 C10); Live Activity chip is small + dim |
| Voice model stolen (someone records Maria saying trigger) | Motion / grip / heartbeat cross-check (Watch, V2) | Multi-factor: voice + sustained grip pressure + Watch heart-rate spike |
| BPO queue full | Queue depth > N seconds | AI extends handling; auto-pages secondary BPO; SLA breach logged |
| 911 audio relay rejected | PSAP auto-responds "no audio relay" | Fallback to text-to-911 + voice call from Mayday number relaying to Maria |
| Maria says safe-word mid-event | Voice match + no concurrent threat audio | Stop capture, notify contacts "false alarm," log for threshold tuning |
16 · Requirements derived from these use cases
Each UC implies concrete engineering, ops, and product requirements. Pulling the highest-leverage ones:
| Req ID | From UC | Requirement | Acceptance |
|---|---|---|---|
| R-1 | UC-6 | On-device wake-word detection with personalized model | Detection latency P95 ≤ 1.0s; FAR ≤ 1.5/user/mo |
| R-2 | UC-6 | Silent handoff (no screen flash, no audio cue) | Passenger-detection test in usability lab ≤ 5% |
| R-3 | UC-7 | Dual-camera + audio concurrent capture with 5s encrypted chunking to S3 | 30-min continuous capture without dropping a chunk |
| R-4 | UC-7 | Append-only chain-of-custody ledger | Every chunk SHA-256 logged; tamper-evident |
| R-5 | UC-8 | Broadcast to N contacts via Twilio + push + email | Delivered to ≥4/5 contacts within 5s |
| R-6 | UC-9 | Outbound Twilio call from Mayday number to user, AI-greeted | Call placed within 5s of trigger |
| R-7 | UC-9 | BPO supervisor console with live audio + GPS + transcript | Human voice on user line P95 ≤ 30s |
| R-8 | UC-10 | RapidSOS / Carbyne integration for 911 | Case auto-populates at PSAP; audio relay supported where jurisdiction allows |
| R-9 | UC-10 | Verbal de-escalation playbooks for operators | Operators certified per Police Foundation standard |
| R-10 | UC-11 | Voiceprint-verified safe-word | Disarm within 5s of safe-word spoken |
| R-11 | UC-12 | Notarized evidence bundle export | Detective-acceptable per Fed. R. Evid. 901/902 |
| R-12 | UC-13 | 24h aftercare prompt + partner network (RAINN, Lyft Healthcare, therapists) | ≥40% of users engage aftercare; partners contracted in 10 states by launch |
| R-13 | UC-3 | Mandatory first-run drill + monthly cadence | Cannot skip; 70% monthly retention of drill habit |
| R-14 | UC-5 | Battery drain ≤ 5%/hr during shift arm | Measured on iPhone 12 and Pixel 6 baseline |
| R-15 | UC-3 | Always-Allow location enforced before app is armed | Foreground-only ("While Using") is rejected with one-tap Settings CTA; app stays unarmed; cached last 24h of fixes available offline |
| R-16 | UC-3 | Always-on microphone + media-recording permissions enforced; iOS mic-indicator and Android MediaProjection-prompt supported | All 6 onboarding entitlements (mic, location-Always, camera, mic+media-recording, motion, notifications+critical alerts) granted before first-run drill; trigger-time MediaProjection completes in < 2s |
Appendix · What this document proves
- Capability is concrete, not aspirational. Every step has timing, owner, and failure mode. The system survives the realistic messiness of a 65-mph attack by a stranger in the back seat.
- Viability shows up in the seams. Referral attribution (UC-1), trial conversion (UC-2), drill-driven retention (UC-4), aftercare-driven LTV (UC-13) — each UC maps to a revenue or retention lever.
- The hard parts are named, not hidden. False triggers, phone-theft mid-event, battery death, 911 audio rejection, BPO queue saturation, voice-model theft — all listed with detection + fallback.
- Compliance is built-in. Two-party consent, evidence admissibility (FRE 901/902), e-notary, S3 Object Lock — baked into UC-9, UC-11, UC-12.